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Abstract
Response mode research shows that participants under a judgment response mode
demonstrate more compensatory processing than participants under a choice mode.
Research on affect and choice reveals that positive-affect participants display more
noncompensatory examination of information than negative-affect participants. In
the present study, participants viewed a film clip to induce positive or negative affect
and made judgments or choices for a series of candidates for a university professor's
position. Results indicate a powerful effect for response mode across all dependent
variables whereby judgment participants took more time, looked at more
information, and showed less search variability than choice participants. The
influence of affect, however, was undetectable, and several hypotheses are advanced
to account for this finding.
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The Effect of Response Mode and Affective State on Multi attribute Decision-Making
For any decision to be made, there are a number of ways of locating a
satisfying solution. Consider a personnel manager attempting to fill a sales position.
Applicant "A" may spend his or her life on the road, making sales every day of the
year but Christmas. This applicant, however, is known in the industry as somewhat
negligent with paperwork and fairly hostile toward direction from management.
Applicant "B", however, is moderate in all ways. "B" is competent and easy-going,
though unremarkable in any facet of the job.
W hich applicant the personnel manager chooses depends on the type of
decision process employed. If asked merely to choose an applicant, it is perfectly
reasonable to consider sales ability the most important aspect of the job and remove
from consideration all applicants not meeting a certain cut score. Such a process
would no doubt result in selecting applicant "A". However, if the personnel manager
rated applicants based on all attributes weighted equally, applicant "B" would likely
be hired. The ultimate decision depends on the form of response required, even
though the field of alternative choices remains the same.
Research on this "response mode" effect has found it robust. Further,
research on the process of multiattribute decision-making suggests that different
response modes result in the use of different decision strategies. Response modes
are not the only such influence, however. Recent research demonstrates that
affective state also guides decision strategies (Forgas, 1989, 1991; Isen & Means,
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1983). The present study will explore the relationship between affect and response
mode in multiattribute decision-making.
This topic is especially germane to industrial/organizational psychology. Many
aspects of this field focus on making decisions among several alternatives. One
example relating to employee selection was given above. Other types of
multiattribute decisions include the choice of selection instruments or compensation
and benefits packages. Interestingly, these decisions are open to variation simply due
to the format of the response desired. As will be discussed in detail below, decision
makers required to evaluate all alternatives before making a selection (judgment) are
likely to use a different combination of decision processes from those required only
to select an alternative outright (choice).
The first section of this paper discusses the decision processes studied here,
along with an examination of the methods by which they are assessed. The second
section examines response mode effects. Next, affective influences on decision
making are reviewed. A summary of the research appears next, followed by
hypotheses for the relationship of response mode and affect. Finally, the proposed
design and execution of the experiment are delineated.
Assessing Decision Processes
Before discussing decision processes in detail, it is necessary to describe the
terms and paradigm used here. A decision problem is one in which the subject must
evaluate a series of alternatives and select one. An alternative is a unique solution
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w ithin a decision problem. Each alternative is described by a set of attributes. In the
example above, candidates "A" and "B" are alternatives, while the sales record and
rating for paperwork management are examples of attributes.
Techniques for Inferring Decision Behavior
Two general methods for studying decision behavior are policy capturing and
process tracing. Policy capturing relies on the combination of input cues and the
final decision to infer the underlying decision process (Billings & Marcus, 1983). It
has been criticized as focusing solely on the final decision to the detriment of insights
on the process of coming to that decision (Payne, 1976). A related criticism concerns
its insensitivity to the range of different cognitive operations which may result in
similar final decisions (Abelson & Levi, 1985). Given the availability of more sensitive
indicators of the decision process, the present study will not employ policy capturing.
Process tracing refers to a group of methods which focus on participants'
acquisition and processing of information prior to making a choice (Abelson & Levi,
1985). These methods include recording eye movements, analysis of verbal
protocols, and the use of information boards. All of these methods rely on some
form of matrix presentation of alternatives and attributes.
Eve movement. Several forms of eye movement may indicate information
acquisition and processing. These include duration, fixation density, and the
sequence of fixations (Abelson & Levi, 1985). While this is a remarkably subtle
indication of information processing, it is impractical for the present experiment.
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Verbal protocols. When verbal protocol analysis is employed, participants are
instructed to "think aloud" while examining and processing information. Transcripts
of the verbal reports are then broken down and coded by decision process (Abelson
& Levi, 1985). Although enticing, this method suffers from the requirement of a large
investment of time and resources, both for collecting and analyzing the data. As a
result, verbal protocols will not be employed in the present study.
Information boards. An information board is generally a board containing
cards or envelopes (with cards inside) organized in an alternative x attribute matrix
(e.g., Billings and Scherer, 1989, 1991; Payne, 1976). More recent research employs
computerized presentation of the information, allowing for instantaneous and
completely accurate recording of information search activity (e.g., "Mouselab";
Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993).
Several assumptions underly the use of information boards as indicators of
decision processes. The fundamental assumption is that the pattern of search for
information indicates the subject's decision processes (Svenson, 1979). Related to
this, it is understood that examination of a given piece of information is driven by a
deliberate decision making strategy (Abelson & Levi, 1985; Svenson, 1979). Finally,
prolonged attention to a piece of information denotes the use of more complex
cognitive processes (Abelson & Levi, 1985; Svenson, 1979).
Abelson and Levi (1985) note that validation of these assumptions requires
information boards to be paired with other methods. Payne (1976) employed
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information boards and verbal protocols together in two experiments and found

\

them compatible. Billings and Marcus (1983) compared the information board and
policy capturing models and found that both reflected a representative range of
decision processes. However, the methods did not converge. The authors explained
the differences as a result of different task requirements for the two models. Ford,
Schmitt, Schechtman, Hults, and Doherty (1989) performed a review of studies
employing verbal protocols and information boards. Their review indicated that
information boards were employed twice as often as verbal protocols, with a small
proportion of experiments using both. The researchers included no substantive
comparison of the two methods. However, the ongoing popularity of information
boards suggests that the underlying assumptions are acceptable. As a result, given its
superior ratio of benefits to problems, the information board technique will be
employed in the present experiment.
Information Evaluation Models
Although there are many ways in which to categorize decision behavior, the
present study is concerned with how decision-makers combine and evaluate attribute
information in order to make their decisions. When participants combine
information across attributes for comparison to a criterion, they are said to be using a
compensatory evaluation model (Abelson & Levi, 1985). The term "compensatory" is
used because high scores on one attribute compensate for low scores on another. As
a result, a poor showing on a given attribute does not necessarily remove the
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alternative from consideration. Noncompensatory evaluation models assume that
each attribute is compared separately.
The distinction between compensatory and noncompensatory models is
important due to the belief that better decisions result from consideration of more
evidence. By definition, compensatory models presume the use of more available
relevant information than do non-compensatory models. As such, they are more
likely to locate the alternative with the highest overall utility. This does not
necessarily mean that compensatory models are always superior to non
compensatory models, nor is it intended to imply that non-compensatory models are
not systematic. One can easily imagine situations in which non-compensatory
models result in superior decision performance. For example, time pressure is likely
to lead to better decisions resulting from non-compensatory models.
In information board research, there are two variables used to determine the
type of evaluation model (Payne, 1976). The first variable is the depth of information
searched. It is calculated as the amount of information examined as a percentage of
the total information available. A high depth of information searched suggests that
the subject is attempting to get as complete a view of the various alternatives as
possible. The most likely reason for such behavior is that the subject is employing a
compensatory decision model and ensuring that the alternative ultimately chosen is
the one with the highest overall utility.
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The second variable that would indicate the use of compensatory strategies is
the variability of search. This is calculated as the standard deviation of the number of
items searched per alternative within a given decision problem. Participants
examining more information for some alternatives over others would therefore have
a high variability of search, while those studying a constant amount of information
across alternatives have a minimal (or zero) search variability. Low search variability
suggests a compensatory model in that participants appear to be integrating a wide
range of information for each alternative prior to choice. High search variability,
therefore, denotes a noncompensatory decision model. One notable exception
arises when a decision-maker looks at only one attribute. In this case, compensatory
processing has obviously not occurred, but search variability is zero. An easy way to
compensate for this is to ensure that each alternative shares any given attribute value
with one or more other alternatives.
Search variability is a more intuitive indicator of compensatory or
noncompensatory evaluation than is search depth. This is mainly because it provides
evidence of the consistency with which information is combined. Following from
previous research (e.g., Payne, 1976; Westenberg & Koele, 1992), search variability is
used here as the main gauge of the information evaluation model used.
Information Search Patterns
In addition to the evaluation models outlined above, it is also educational to
determine whether the decision-maker is searching by alternatives (e.g., different job
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candidates) or attributes (e.g., sales record). The information search pattern illustrates
whether alternatives or attributes are the focus of examination (Svenson, 1979).
Search pattern is calculated as the number of moves from one attribute to another
within an alternative minus the number of moves from one alternative to another, all
of which is divided by the sum of the two types of moves (Payne, 1976). A positive
pattern index represents alternative-wise search, while a negative pattern index
reflects attribute-wise search.
An alternative-wise search suggests that the decision-maker moves from
attribute to attribute within a given alternative. For example, the personnel manager
would study first the sales record and then the personal references for the first
candidate. An attribute-wise search suggests that the decision-maker inspects
information for a given attribute one alternative at a time. For example, after looking
at the first applicant's sales record, the personnel manager would look at the sales
record for the second applicant.
Decision Rules
Although a number of decision rules have been proposed (e.g., Svenson,
1979), four main rules have been examined in research using information boards
(Abelson & Levi, 1985; Ford, Schmitt, Schechtman, Hults, & Doherty, 1989;
Westenberg & Koele, 1992). Payne (1976) suggested consideration of these
particular rules for their implications about the processes involved in their use. Each
rule corresponds to a unique combination of evaluation model (compensatory or
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noncompensatory) and information search pattern (attribute-wise or alternative-wise).
These rules are detailed below and presented in Table 1.
A compensatory evaluation model using attribute-wise search reflects the use
of a linear decision rule (Payne, 1976). The decision-maker determines a utility score
for each attribute of a given alternative and then sums the utilities to create a grand
score for that alternative. Summing utilities across attributes indicates a
compensatory evaluation model. In terms of information board variables, the linear
decision rule is reflected by low search variability (compensatory evaluation model)
and a positive pattern index (alternative-wise search).
A compensatory evaluation model using alternative-wise search indicates an
additive difference rule (Tversky, 1969). According to this rule, the decision-maker
compares the utilities of different alternatives on the same attribute. The utility
differences for the set of attributes considered are then combined to determine the
overall evaluation. As above, this strategy employs a compensatory evaluation model
because the utility differences are combined across attributes. The additive
difference rule is understood when participants demonstrate low search variability
(compensatory evaluation model) and a negative pattern index (attribute-wise
search).
Elimination-by-aspects (Tversky, 1972) involves a non-compensatory
evaluation model and alternative-wise search. Using this rule, cut scores are
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Table 1
Decision Rules by Evaluation Model and Information Search Pattern

Information Search Pattern
Attribute-wise

Alternative-wise

Decision Rule

Linear

Additive Difference

Pattern Index

Positive

Negative

Low

Low

Decision Rule

Conjunctive

Elimination by Aspects

Pattern Index

Positive

Negative

High

High

Compensatory Evaluation

Variability
Noncompensatory Evaluation

Variability
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established for each attribute. Starting with the most important attribute, alternatives
not meeting the cut score are eliminated from further consideration. This process
continues down the line of attribute importance until only one alternative remains.
In information board research, elimination-by-aspects is represented by high search
variability (noncompensatory evaluation model) and a positive pattern index
(alternative-wise search).
Finally, use of a non-compensatory evaluation model with attribute-wise
search indicates a conjunctive decision rule. As in the elimination-by-aspects rule,
the decision-maker establishes a set of criteria for each attribute. Each alternative is
examined, and failure of any attribute to meet the criterion results in the rejection of
the alternative (Svenson, 1979). The conjunctive decision rule is symbolized by high
search variability (noncompensatory evaluation model) and a negative pattern index
(attribute-wise search).
A literature review by Ford et. al (1989) noted that all of the above decision
rules were observed in at least some of the research. The researchers also noted,
however, that participants tended to prefer noncompensatory evaluation models.
This may be due to the increased cognitive effort required by compensatory
evaluation (e.g., Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Payne, 1982).
Response Modes
The response modes under study here are judgment and choice. Although
research has been performed with other response modes such as grouping and
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rejecting alternatives (e.g., Westenberg & Koele, 1992), judgment and choice appear
most frequently in the non-gambling literature (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993).
Judgment tasks are those in which the subject assigns a rating to each alternative prior
to making a choice. Choice tasks refer to tasks requiring the decision maker to select
the best alternative w ithout requiring explicit evaluation of each alternative (Billings &
Scherer, 1988; Payne, 1982).
Response modes influence the adoption of decision rules. A choice mode
allows free selection of the strategies used to make a decision. Judgment, however,
necessarily implies at least some use of compensatory evaluation. A judgment task
requires an overall evaluation of each alternative. This is unlikely to be accomplished
w ithout at least some combination of utilities for attributes within alternatives.
Combining utilities, as mentioned above, defines compensatory evaluation. As
discussed immediately below, response mode research supports the greater role
played by compensatory evaluation under a judgment mode.
Response Mode Research
Billings and Scherer (1988) examined the role of decision importance and
response mode on decision strategy. They reviewed research suggesting that
important decisions require more careful and thorough processing. Important
decisions should therefore lead to more compensatory evaluation than Iess-important
decisions. The researchers hypothesized an interaction of decision importance and
response mode such that processes underlying judgment (compensatory evaluation
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and interdimensional search) will occur for participants in a choice response mode
who are led to believe that the decision they are making is important. In other
words, they hypothesized that participants would use compensatory evaluation in
both high and low importance conditions under judgment and in the high
importance condition under a choice response mode.
Billings and Scherer (1988) employed a residence-advisor selection task
whereby they presented participants (who were living in residence halls at the time)
with eight boards listing six candidates for residence hall advisors. Each board
displayed a matrix of eight attributes for the six candidates. Each element of the
matrix was presented in an envelope. Participants opened envelopes at will, read the
contents, and turned them around within the envelope so that the information
remained visible. Participants worked with only one board of candidates at a time
and could not progress to a subsequent board without making a judgment or choice
for the current board.
The authors reported several interesting findings. First, they found a main
effect for response mode on the amount of information searched. Participants under
judgment looked at 82.5% of the pieces of information while those under choice
looked at only 56.7%. This is well in line with the idea that participants under
judgment use more compensatory models and therefore examine more information
than participants under choice. The researchers also found a significant interaction
between response mode and importance on information search. Simple effects
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analyses revealed that, as expected, significantly more information was sought in the
high-importance condition under choice than in the low-importance condition under
choice (29.9 vs. 24.5), while no significant differences appeared between importance
conditions under judgment.
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also performed for both variability of search
and pattern of search. Both analyses revealed significant main effects for response
mode such that judgment resulted in a lower standard deviation of attributes
searched than choice and also more interdimensional (within alternative) search than
choice.
Log-linear analyses were performed to verify use of the four decision rules
outlined above. Results revealed that elimination-by-aspects was more likely under
choice than under judgment and more likely under low importance than under high
importance. This finding is well in line with the theory suggested above. Eliminationby-aspects is a non-compensatory rule and is therefore more likely to occur under
choice and, with respect to the interaction of response mode and importance, more
likely under low importance. This was due to the high-importance condition
resulting in more compensatory evaluation.
Billings and Scherer (1991) examined the effects of response mode on
decision processes and outcomes, as well as postdecision regret. Their first
hypothesis concerned the effect of response mode on quantity of information
searched, information search variability, and search pattern. This was essentially to
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replicate Billings and Scherer (1988). Their second hypothesis was that the judgment
and choice would result in different alternative choices. They also hypothesized that
selecting an optimal alternative under choice is more likely to occur when explicit
judgments are required about the alternatives. Finally, they hypothesized that choice
will lead to less satisfaction with the decision, more postdecisional regret, and more
revocation of the decision.
Participants performed two tasks. The first task required them to rate the
desirability of 81 jobs, each of which was described on five different dimensions.
The second task was a computerized version of the information board described
above. Participants went through four sets of displays in which they made choices or
judgments about five jobs, each of which was described on five dimensions.
Results supported hypothesis one in the same manner as Billings and Scherer
(1988) and need not be reiterated. Hypothesis two was only partially supported due
to the overwhelming effect of the job salary attribute. Response mode did not affect
the choice of optimal alternatives, thus hypothesis three was not supported. Finally,
postdecisional regret and dissatisfaction were unaffected by response mode.
However, participants in the choice mode were significantly more likely to want to
go back and pick a lower-paying job than were participants in the judgment mode.
Westenberg and Koele (1992) attempted to distinguish the source of response
mode effects from three competing hypotheses. The prominence hypothesis (Slovic,
1975) suggests that choice is based on the selection of the alternative superior on the
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most important attribute, whereas judgment requires more compensatory evaluation.
By selecting such an alternative in choice, one can avoid the mental strain of
performing any compensatory evaluation and can still justify one's choice to one's self
and others. The compatibility hypothesis (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1973) suggests that
attributes expressed in a manner similar to the format required for the response will
be weighted more in processing. Two reasons support this hypothesis. First, the
importance of compatibility may be highlighted by the response mode. Second,
converting a set of attributes to a format useful for compensatory evaluation requires
additional mental effort.
Westenberg and Koele advanced a third hypothesis which suggests that
response modes lie on an information processing continuum with judgment and
compensatory evaluation at one end and choice and non-compensatory evaluation
on the other. They go on to suggest, in line with Beach and Mitchell (1978) and
Payne (1982), that response mode effects result from attempts to minimize effort
where possible. This can be done in choice, and so simpler strategies are selected.
Judgment tasks require explicit evaluation of each alternative. They therefore offer
less opportunity to minimize effort and use simple strategies, hence the response
mode effect.
Westenberg and Koele (1992) examined the effect of a set of response modes
(selecting/choice, rejecting, classifying, and ranking/judgment) and information load
(high vs. low) on the use of decision rules as reflected by process tracing. Since
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judgment and choice are of paramount concern here, the other response modes will
be excluded from discussion.
Results indicated no effect for response mode on depth of search. Curiously,
all participants looked at a very high proportion of information. Response mode
resulted in a main effect on variability and pattern of search, both in the expected
directions. Analysis of the decision strategies revealed that participants in the choice
mode with low information load used compensatory evaluation models more than in
the high information load. For both types of information load, however, judgment
resulted in more use of compensatory evaluation models than did choice. The
researchers interpreted the results as supporting their hypothesis of a response mode
continuum.
Taken as a set, the studies reported above illustrate powerful effects for
response mode on decision processes. When asked to make a choice, participants
tend toward quicker, non-compensatory processes (Billings & Scherer, 1988, 1991;
Westenberg & Koele, 1992). When asked to make a judgment, however, decision
makers must employ some degree of compensatory evaluation, depending on the
number of alternatives under consideration (Westenberg & Koele, 1992).
Response mode research offers clear implications for organizational decision
makers. Selecting employees under choice is unlikely to result in consistently offering
jobs to the most valuable applicants. Since judgment requires consideration of more
data, the most valuable applicants will probably be uncovered. Given that these
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outcomes are a function of task instructions, the implications for organizations should
be quite clear. Requiring explicit evaluations of each applicant for a job will
ultimately maximize the organization's utility, at practically no cost other than
decision time.
Influences on Decision Strategies
The results presented above provide compelling evidence that the effects of
response mode on decision-making are robust. It is particularly interesting that
decision strategy can be affected by something so innocuous as a simple change in
instructions. Payne (1982) and Ford et al. (1989) list several categories of influences
on decision processes. Task effects, such as response mode, focus on the structural
characteristics of the problem. Context effects pertain to the values inherent in the
objects of the decision or their attributes. Finally, person characteristics, such as
affective state, are likely to play a role, although Ford et al. (1989) noted a paucity of
relevant research.
The former two influences listed above imply easily manipulated variables and
therefore have been researched extensively. Person characteristics, however,
represent a more subtle effect. Recent work in the study of affect suggests that
decision strategies are influenced by a subject's affective state (Forgas, 1989, 1991;
Isen & Means, 1983; Mano, 1992). Further, several researchers have suggested that
mild, naturally occurring affective states such as pleasantness have fairly predictable,
pervasive effects on decision processes (Isen, 1984, 1987; Lewinsohn & Mano, 1993;
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Mano, 1992). As will be shown, these effects are not unlike those of response
modes.
Affective State Theory
Unfortunately, little theory directly relates affective states to multiattribute
decision-making. However, several theorists have advanced claims relevant to this
discussion. Lewinsohn and Mano (1993) and Mano (1992) suggested that two
processes underlie affective influences in decision making. First, they posited that
participants experiencing positive affect use more elaborate strategies because they
perceive the decision task as something to enjoy. In contrast, Isen (1987) suggested
that persons who are feeling good may be more likely to use heuristics in order to
maintain their good mood. The type of decision appears to play an important role
here. One would probably spend more time selecting a gift to receive than choosing
among brands of laundry detergent. Second, Lewinsohn and Mano (1993) and Mano
(1992) stated that high arousal restricts attention and prevents the use of mental
processing resources on the decision task.
Affective State and Problem Solving
Problem solving research indicates significant affective influences on cognitive
processes. In a set of experiments, Isen, Daubman, and Nowicki (1987) found that
participants experiencing positive affect were more likely to find creative solutions to
problems than participants experiencing neutral affect (Experiments 1, 2, and 3) or
negative affect (Experiment 2). The authors interpreted their results as suggesting that
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positive affect defocuses the participants' attention enough to allow them to see more
possible connections between stimuli. Green and Noice (1988) performed a similar
study of problem solving with adolescents and also found facilitative effects for
affective state on problem solving.
Kavanagh (1987) asked participants to imagine vivid happy or sad occasions in
their lives while playing them selections of music to help evoke the associated
affective states. A third group of participants listened only to a tape of instructions.
Participants then performed an anagram-solving task. Happy participants persisted at
the anagram task longer and found more solutions than did sad participants. This
research provides further support for a facilitative role of affect in problem solving.
Knapp and Clark (1991) reported a pair of studies in which participants
♦

experiencing happiness, sadness, anger, or no emotion performed a resource
dilemma task. In this task, participants gained credit for fish taken from a pool over a
series of trials. The stock offish regenerated in proportion to the number remaining.
Negative moods (sadness and anger) led participants to cash in more fish in early
trials than the pool could support. The authors interpreted this as indicating that
negative affect results in an inability to delay gratification. As a result, participants
make suboptimal decisions.
Taken as a whole, then, these studies show a fairly reliable influence for affect
on problem solving. Positive affect facilitates problem solving, while negative affect
results in less inspired behavior.
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Affective State and Decision Processes
Isen and Means (1983) reported a seminal study on affective state and
decision processes. This experiment attempted to determine whether participants
experiencing positive affect try to maintain their good moods by using more
simplifying strategies in multiattribute decision-making. Further, the researchers
assessed the quality of these decisions compared to those made by control
participants.
Participants in this experiment first performed an ostensibly unrelated
perceptual-motor task and received either no feedback (control) or bogus highly
positive feedback (positive affect group). They then performed an automobile
selection task using an information board containing nine attributes each for six cars
and were told to choose a car. The experimenters collected verbal protocols while
the subject performed the task.
Results produced by this experiment were striking. Positive-affect participants
took significantly less time to come to a decision than did neutral-affect participants.
Furthermore, they looked at less information overall and at significantly fewer classes
of attributes than did neutral-affect participants. Examination of sample verbal
protocols confirms that participants in the positive affect group appear to have relied
on a non-compensatory evaluation model. Further, neutral affect group strategies
appear much more compensatory. The researchers examined decision quality as
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degree of similarity to a personally optimal choice and found it equal across affective
states.
The overall pattern of results suggests that the experience of positive affect
creates an almost-exclusive preference for non-compensatory decision strategies
typical of the choice response mode. As in Westenberg and Koele's (1992) low
information load and choice mode condition, neutral participants tended to use a
balanced assortment of compensatory and non-compensatory decision processes.
Taken together, positive and neutral affect bear an arresting resemblance to choice
and judgment response mode effects on decision strategies.
Forgas (1989) evaluated the effect of mood (happy, neutral, or sad, induced
by false feedback) and personal relevance of the decision (relevant or irrelevant) on
decision-making strategies in choosing a partner. As in Isen and Means (1983),
participants in a positive mood finished significantly faster than those in a negative or
neutral mood. Sad participants eliminated fewer units, requested information more
frequently, and considered more information of low relevance than did those in the
happy or neutral conditions. Analysis of decision strategy revealed that happy
participants more often used elimination by alternatives (a noncompensatory rule)
than did sad participants. Mood did not influence decision strategy when the
decision was personally relevant, a finding similar to Billings and Scherer's (1988)
effect for decision importance.
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Forgas (1991) replicated the research described above on the effect of affect
on speed of processing. He also found that, for impersonal decisions, all participants
tended to use noncompensatory decision strategies (Experiment 2), similar to the
effect of the choice mode. However, in Experiment 3, participants in positive moods
employed compensatory evaluation models less than participants in negative moods,
as in Isen and Means (1983).
Negative Versus Neutral Affect
Isen (1987) suggested that cognitive effects due to negative affect are not
necessarily exact opposites of those for positive affect. However, research by Forgas
(1989, 1991) supports the assumption that positive and negative affect do indeed
lead to opposite effects on the type of task employed here. The role of neutral affect,
in comparison, is more enigmatic. Isen and Means (1983) found a significant
difference between positive and neutral affect for decision time and information
search. Forgas (1989, 1991, Experiments 2 and 3) found that participants in negative
or neutral moods (control participants) did not differ in amount of time taken to
reach a decision. However, participants in negative moods reexamined information
they had previously seen more often than positive- or neutral-mood participants,
with the latter groups showing no significant difference (Forgas, 1989). Finally, both
positive and negative affect participants differed significantly in decision strategy
(Forgas, 1989). Neither group differed significantly from the neutral affect
participants, however. It is difficult to predict the role of neutral affect. Previous
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research, however, shows clear effects for positive and negative affect. For this
reason, the proposed experiment employs only positive and negative affect
conditions.
Summary of Affect and Decision Making
The above studies illustrate a powerful influence for affect on decision
processes. Participants experiencing positive affect appear to rush through the
decision, confident in their ability to select the best alternative (Forgas, 1989, 1991;
Isen & Means, 1983). Participants experiencing neutral (Isen & Means, 1983) or
negative affect (Forgas, 1989, 1991), tend to be more careful and compensatory, if
not overly efficient, in their decision making.
Forgas (1989, 1991) found that personal relevance of the decision somewhat
reduced effects due to affective state. Assuming personal relevance is analogous to a
broader construct of decision importance, it appears that even ecstatic personnel
managers are likely to give due consideration to an employee selection decision. On
the other hand, while the role of affect in decision processes was mitigated, it still had
a noticeable effect. Therefore, concluding that personnel managers are likely to
consider their decisions so important as to circumvent affective influences would be
ill-advised.
The role of affect in decision-making appears to run counter to its role in
problem solving, as outlined above. Most notably, participants experiencing positive
affect persist at problem solving tasks, but rush through decision making tasks. This
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conflict is probably due to differences in the underlying tasks. Participants probably
found the problem solving tasks more engaging than the decision making tasks. The
fact that Sunday newspapers generally contain a page of problems to solve (such as
anagrams) and not a page of decisions to make attests to this. Further, Isen (1987)
suggested that participants experiencing positive affect tend to rely greatly on
heuristics. Use of such heuristics speeds processing in the choice problems outlined
above, but may provide less assistance in the problem solving tasks where insight is
necessary.
Summary and Hypotheses
From the research presented above, two trends are clear. First, response
modes are robust in their effects on decision strategies. The judgment mode
necessarily leads to extensive use of compensatory processes. The choice mode may
result in the employment of compensatory or non-compensatory evaluation models,
subject to other environmental or personal constraints or facilitators.
Strong variations in decision processes are unlikely to occur when task or
context cues encourage high-quality decisions. In such cases, compensatory
processes will be used. The judgment response mode, for example, forces a higher
quality decision because participants must evaluate all alternatives. Context cues
related to decision importance (Billings & Scherer, 1988) or personal relevance
(Forgas, 1989, 1991) also result in compensatory decision processes in a choice
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mode, because it is intuitively understood that better decisions result from
consideration of all relevant information.
When there are no such task constraints and a choice is solicited, decision
processes are open to influence by personal variables, such as affect. According to
Forgas (1989, p. 211), the non-compensatory nature of happy participants1 decision
strategies arises from "the greater self-confidence and boldness of people to ignore or
'skip' information seen as less important." A task demand such as a judgment
response mode should at least partially overcome the tendency of happy participants
to choose non-compensatory decision strategies. Previous research delineated
affective influences in choice. However, no research yet has examined affective
influences in judgment. The present experiment, then, breaks new ground by
examining the combined effects of response mode and affective state on decision
processes.
Hypotheses
Information evaluation models. Based on the arguments presented
immediately above, response mode and affective state should interact as follows.
Participants experiencing positive affect under a choice response mode will exhibit
the least amount of compensatory information evaluation. Hypothesis 1 a, then, is
that search variability will be highest for participants in the positive affect-choice
mode condition. Hypothesis 1 b is that depth of search will be lowest for participants
in the positive affect-choice mode condition.
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Time. Forgas (1989, 1991) and Isen and Means (1983) found participants
experiencing positive affect completed choice tasks significantly faster than
participants in other conditions. As noted above, this effect likely stems from these
participants' predominant use of non-compensatory information evaluation. Since
non-compensatory evaluation is also endemic to the choice response mode,
Hypothesis 2 is an interaction between response mode and affective state such that
participants in the positive affect-choice mode condition will spend the least amount
of time on the task.
Information search patterns. No formal hypotheses are advanced for
information search patterns. However, when search pattern index is combined with
search variability, participants' decision rules may be examined. It would be
instructive to examine participants' use of decision rules relative to the experimental
condition to which they belong. Exploratory Question 1 is to explore decision rule
use across conditions.
Redundant information searched. As noted above, Forgas (1989) found that
participants experiencing negative affect reexamined information they had already
seen more often than did other participants. Redundant information search has not,
to the knowledge of the author, previously appeared in information board research.
Given the limits of working memory, redundant information search may offer some
alternate indication of information evaluation models and is therefore included for
exploratory purposes as Exploratory Question 2.
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Pilot Study

1

Method
As noted above, the variability of number of items of information searched
and the depth of information searched play key roles in determining a participant's
information evaluation model. Both variables will assume constant values if
participants' curiosity leads them to examine all available items of information prior
to making their decisions. In such cases, search variability would be zero and search
depth would be 100%. These variables would therefore be of no use in
distinguishing differences in information evaluation models across conditions.
Two methods are available for reducing this behavior. Either additional trials
may be employed (e.g., Billings & Scherer, 1988), or the load of information available
to the participants may be increased (e.g., Olshavsky, 1979). The former strategy
assumes that participants will eventually tire of examining all of the information. The
latter strategy forces participants to consider at the outset that there may be more
information to examine than they wish.
The first pilot test examined the efficacy of using a high information load to
prevent a ceiling effect of search depth. The high information load strategy was
employed for several reasons. First, sessions in the Billings and Scherer (1988)
experiment lasted 75 minutes. Given that the manipulation of affect requires some
time, the addition of trials might make the experimental sessions last an inordinately
long time. Second, the point at which participants determine that it is no longer
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worthwhile to look at every item of information is a question for empirical study.
Because the placement of the affect manipulation depends on this assurance, it is
simpler to raise the information load and avoid conducting an additional pilot study.
Participants and Design
This experiment employed 50 undergraduates participating for course credit.
Participants were randomly assigned by the computer to either the choice or
judgment response mode conditions (explained in detail below). In all, 17
participants were assigned to the judgment mode and 33 participants were assigned
to the choice mode.
Task
The task employed was to choose a professor using a computerized
information board similar to that described by Payne, Bettman, and Johnson (1993)
and Westenberg and Koele (1992). Each information board contained

8

possible

professors, each of which was described by a set of 16 ratings similar to those used
for evaluating instructors. The ratings were derived so that no professor dominated
any other on all attributes. The attributes and attribute levels are reproduced in the
Appendix.
To obtain information on an attribute of a particular alternative, the subject
placed the mouse cursor over the box in the grid where the attribute and the
alternative intersect and clicked a mouse button. The desired information appeared
onscreen for the duration of time that the mouse button remained depressed.
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Participants in the choice response mode were instructed to type the initials of the
professor they would choose in a box on the right side of the screen. Participants in
the judgment response mode had to type in an overall rating from
100

1

to

100

(where

is the top rating) for each professor in a box at the bottom of the screen, as well

as choose a professor.
Procedure
After entering the test area, the purpose of the experiment and the nature of
the task was explained to the participants. They were then seated at computers in
individual rooms. A short tutorial screen prior to the main task helped ensure that
participants had a basic understanding of the task. Participants performed six trials
separated by a break after the third trial in which they viewed a short film clip.
Results and Discussion
Search depth was calculated for each trial as a proportion of the amount of
information examined to the total amount of information available. Table 2 displays
the search depth means for participants across trials. Consultation of Table 2
illustrates that no ceiling effect is evident. These results suggest that a high
information load successfully discouraged participants from capriciously examining all
available items of information.
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Table 2
Mean Search Depth by Response Mode and Trial

Trial
Response Mode

1

2

3

4

5

6

Judgment

.6 6

.50

.39

.38

.35

.31

Choice

.2 0

.17

.14

.15

.16

.14

Note. Search depth expressed as a percentage of total information available
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Pilot Study 2
Method
Prior research details a number of manipulations of affect, including the
Velten technique (e.g., Lewinsohn and Mano, 1993), false test feedback (e.g., Forgas,
1991, 1993; Isen & Means, 1983), and film clips (e.g., Isen & Daubman, 1984; Isen,
Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987). The film clip method was chosen due to its ease of
implementation and prior success (e.g., Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987; Kraiger,
Billings, & Isen, 1989). The present pilot study was performed to determine which
films should be used to induce positive and negative affect. Measurement of affect
was accomplished using a questionnaire devised by Scherer, Butler, Reiter-Palmon,
and Weiss (1994), which is described in the primary study below.
Participants
Fifty-eight undergraduates participated in this experiment for course credit.
Materials
Clips from four films were tested. The films expected to induce positive affect
were Ferris Bueller's Day O ff and Groundhog Day. The films believed to bring about
negative affect were M idnight Express and Old Yeller. The duration of the film clips
ranged from 12 to 14 minutes.
Procedure
Upon entering the testing area, the participant was greeted and the purpose
of the study was explained. After entering some demographic information onto the
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response sheet, participants viewed the assigned film clip. At the conclusion of the
film clip, participants responded to the affect questionnaire.
Results and Discussion
Five subscale scores were developed for each participant based on the
aforementioned factor analysis. Reliability analyses led to the deletion of five items
due to unreliability. Cronbach's alpha for the subscales were .96 for negative arousal,
.77 for positive arousal,

.8 8

for elation, .69 for fear, and .54 for boredom.

One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on each of the five
subscales. In addition, four a priori comparisons were specified such that each
positive-affect film was compared with each negative-affect film for each of the five
subscales. Two participants were deleted from further analyses due to extreme
response patterns that resulted in threats to the assumption of homogeneity of
variance. One subject was deleted because of a lack of clarity as to which film was
viewed. The remaining cell sizes were 13 for "Ferris Bueller's Day O ff", 15 for
"Groundhog Day", 14 for "M idnight Express", and 13 for "O ld Yeller". Due to the
unequal cell sizes, the multiple comparisons employed separate variance estimates in
calculating the t-tests.
The crucial subscales to consider are negative arousal, positive arousal, fear,
and elation. O f all combinations of positive-affect and negative-affect films, only
"Ferris Bueller's Day O ff" and "M idnight Express" elicited the desired combination of
scores. "Ferris Bueller's Day O ff" elicited less negative arousal than "M idnight
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Express" (M = 38.461 and 63.286, respectively; t(51) = 4.993,

jd

< .001), more

positive arousal (M = 11.231 and 16.385, respectively; t(50) = 3.157,
more elation (M = 16.923 and 37.231, respectively; t(50) = 7.188,
less fear (M = 16.000 and 19.786, respectively; t(50) = 2.069,

jd

jd

jd

< .005),

< .001), and

< .05). A

significant difference for boredom across films would suggest that participants found
one film less engaging than the other. This would clearly be an undesirable situation.
No significant difference appeared between "Ferris Bueller's Day O ff" and "M idnight
Express" on the boredom subscale (M = 13.769 and 15.500, respectively;
t(51) = 1.225, ^ > .05). Given this encouraging patterns of results, these films were
selected for the present research.
Note that arousal differences across the two films suggest that any differences
achieved in the present study may be attributable to arousal, instead of affect.
Indeed, few of the studies reviewed above paid any attention to separating the
effects of arousal and affect. Correlations between the dependent variables and the
affect endurance check (described below) will provide an indication of the nature of
these effects.
Primary Study
Method
Participants and Design
The present experiment employed a

2

x 2 (Response Mode x Affective State)

between-participants design. One hundred undergraduate psychology students
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participated in the present experiment and were randomly assigned to conditions.
Given a "large" effect size of .40 (Cohen, 1988), a sample size of 100 results in an
acceptable level of power at .80. Similar response mode research (e.g., Billings &
Scherer, 1988; Westenberg & Koele, 1992) used a comparable sample size and
found statistical significance. As a result, a sample size of 100 participants appeared
suitable. Participants were given course credit for their participation.
Task
The task employed was the "selecting a professor" task described in Pilot
Study 1. To reiterate, participants were presented with a computerized grid of
information to view in order to make their decisions. The grid contained eight
alternatives (the professors), each of which was described by sixteen attributes.
Participants viewed information by clicking a mouse button on the intersection of the
alternative and the attribute. Choices of professors were recorded in a box on the
right side of the screen. Ratings of professors (for participants in the judgment
response mode only) were entered in boxes at the bottom of the screen, beneath a
professor's name.
Manipulation of Independent Variables
Response mode. In the choice condition, participants were told to select the
applicant they felt would perform the best as a professor. In the judgment condition,
participants were told to rate all applicants and then select the best candidate. This
followed from Billings and Scherer (1988) and ensured that the only difference
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between the two response modes is that one group of participants must make explicit
judgments of the alternatives.
Affect. Affect was manipulated by having participants view a short film clip.
Participants in the positive affect condition viewed a clip from "Ferris Bueller's Day
O ff." Participants in the negative affect condition viewed a segment from "M idnight
Express." These films were selected based on Pilot Test 2. As a check on affective
state endurance, participants filled out a 42-item semantic differential scale described
below.
Dependent Variables
Affect endurance check. Affect was measured using an affect questionnaire
employed in previous research (Scherer, Butler, Reiter-Palmon, & Weiss, 1994). The
questionnaire consists of 42 affect adjectives in a semantic differential format. Factor
analysis revealed five main factors underlying the scale: negative arousal (original a =
.90), positive arousal (original a = .63), elation (original a = .74), fear (original a =
.8 6 ), and boredom (original a = .80). The pair of films to be chosen were those
which demonstrated the greatest discrepancies in the appropriate scales. For
example, the film used in the positive affect condition should induce greater positive
arousal and elation than the one used to induce negative affect. Similarly, the film
used for negative affect should result in more negative arousal and fear than the
positive affect film.
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Information evaluation models. Compensatory evaluation suggests that
participants are combining information across attributes in order to make their
decisions (Abelson & Levi, 1985). Under noncompensatory evaluation, attributes are
compared independently. W ith the information board technique, two variables are
related to information evaluation, variability of search and depth of search (Payne,
1976).
Variability of search was calculated as the standard deviation of the number of
items searched per alternative for a given trial. Low search variability suggests that
participants integrate a constant range of information for each alternative, indicating
compensatory evaluation. High search variability, then, reflects noncompensatory
processing.
Depth of search was calculated as the amount of information examined as a
percentage of the total amount of information available. High search depth indicates
compensatory evaluation, since it appears that the participant is attempting to get as
complete a view of the alternatives as possible. Low search depth, then, implies
noncompensatory search.
Information search pattern. Search pattern is an attempt to classify
participants' information search as alternative-based or attribute-based (Svenson,
1979). It was calculated as the number of moves from one attribute to another
w ithin an alternative (alternative-wise search) minus the number of moves from one
alternative to another (attribute-wise search), all divided by the sum of the moves
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(Payne, 1976). A positive pattern index indicates more information sought within
alternatives, while a negative pattern index reflects more information examined by
attribute. The information search pattern is calculated for each trial, for each
participant.
Time. Search time was calculated as the total amount of time in seconds that
a subject spends examining information per trial.
Redundant information searched. Redundant information was counted as the
total units of information that a subject requests to see after having previously viewed
them.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a session lasting approximately 60
minutes. After participants entered the test area, the experimenter explained the
purpose of the experiment and the nature of the task. They then sat down at the
computer and viewed a tutorial demonstration to give them a basic understanding of
the task. The tutorial demonstration also included the response mode manipulation.
Next, participants performed a sample trial of the task. Upon completion of this trial,
the affect manipulation was administered, followed by the two experimental trials.
After completing the experimental trials, the participants completed the affect
endurance check. Finally, they were debriefed and thanked for their participation.
The reasoning behind the placement of the affect manipulation is as follows.
Interviews with several participants in Pilot Study 1 suggest that the task was highly
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engaging. Although the tutorial demonstration is complete, it is apparent that
participants need a full practice trial before they are comfortable with the task. For
this reason, the affect manipulation could not come before the first experimental
trial, lest it be "washed away" by participants' attempts to learn the task.
Data Analysis
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was employed to test hypotheses la , 1b,

2

, and

4. Hypothesis 3, which concerns analysis of the composition of decision rules across
groups, was analyzed using the chi-square statistic.
Results
To recap, this experiment was conducted to verify an hypothesized
interaction between response mode and affective state such that participants
experiencing positive affect and a choice mode will demonstrate less effortful
decision making than participants in other conditions. This tendency will be reflected
in standard process tracing variables, including search variability, search depth, and
trial time. To simplify discussion of the results, participants in the judgment and
choice conditions will be referred to as "judgment participants" and "choice
participants," respectively.
Hypothesis 1a: search variability. This hypothesis suggested an interaction
between response mode and affective state such that choice participants
experiencing positive affect will exhibit higher search variability relative to
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participants in other conditions. Table 3 displays the means and standard deviations
for search
variability for the experimental trials. Table 4 shows the results of the ANOVA for
these trials, which are also displayed graphically in Figures 1 and 2.
Review of Tables 3 and 4 reveals highly significant main effects for the
response mode manipulation across both experimental trials. Choice participants
varied more in the amount of information they examined per alternative than did
judgment participants, regardless of the manipulated affective state. As a result,
hypothesis 1 a is not supported.
Hypothesis 1 b. This hypothesis proposed an interaction of response mode
and affective state where depth of search will be lowest for choice participants in the
positive affect condition. Table 5 reveals the means and standard deviations, and
Table

6

shows the ANOVA results for the experimental trials. Unfortunately, the

homogeneity of variance test reveals significant differences in within-cell variance
across cells for Experimental Trial

2

(Cochran's C(24 ,4 ) = -6 8 , £ < .0 0 1 ). As a result,

conclusions based on this analysis should be made with caution. However, the
pattern of results is similar to Experimental Trial 1. Figures 3 and 4 depict in graphic
form the relationships between the means.
As with Hypothesis 1a, only the main effect of response mode achieved
significance. Judgment participants examined a significantly higher proportion of the
available information than did those participants called upon merely to choose
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Table 3
Search Variability as a Function of Response Mode and Affect
Affect Manipulation
Positive

Negative

Experimental Trial 1
Judgment Mode
M

1.84

1.80

SD

1.54

1.78

M

3.41

3.14

SD

1.76

1.81

Choice Mode

Experimental Trial 2
Judgment Mode
M

2.43

2 .1 0

SD

1.84

1.79

M

4.02

4.41

SD

1.91

1 .8 8

Choice Mode

Note. The values represent the standard deviation of the number of items searched
per alternative.
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Table 4
Analysis of Variance of Search Variability
F
Source

df

Experimental Trial 1
27

***

Experimental Trial 2
17.75***

Response Mode (RM)

1

Affect (A)

1

.0 1

.2 1

RM x A

1

.95

.1 0

Error

96

59

(3.45)

Note. Mean square errors enclosed in parentheses.
* ^ < . 0 5 . * * £ < .0 1 . * **p < .001.

(2.97)
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Figure 1. Mean search variability in experimental trial 1 as a function of response
mode and affect manipulations.
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Figure 2. Mean search variability in experimental trial 2 as a function of response
mode and affect manipulations.
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Table 5
Search Depth as a Function of Response Mode and Affect
Affect Manipulation
Positive

Negative

Experimental Trial 1
Judgment Mode
M

.63

.65

SD

.19

.19

M

.48

.21

SD

.48

.19

Choice Mode

Experimental Trial 2
Judgment Mode
M

.56

.65

SD

.23

.53

M

.41

.35

SD

.18

.2 1

Choice Mode

Note. The values represent the amount of information examined as a percentage of
the total amount of information available.
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Table

6

Analysis of Variance of Search Depth
F
Source

df

Experimental Trial 1

Experimental Trial 2

Response Mode (RM)

1

15.32***

12.55***

Affect (A)

1

.03

.07

RM x A

1

.03

1.32

Error

96

(.04)

Note. Mean square errors enclosed in parentheses.
* ^ < . 0 5 . * * £ < .0 1 . ***p < .001.

(.1 0 )
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Figure 3. Mean search depth in experimental trial 1 as a function of response mode
and affect manipulations.
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Figure 4. Mean search depth in experimental trial 2 as a function of response mode
and affect manipulations.
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among the alternatives. Again, manipulated affect held no sway. The lack of
interaction between the independent variables results in no support for hypothesis
1b.

Hypothesis 2. The present hypothesis proposed an interaction such that
choice participants in the positive affect condition would spend the least amount of
time on the task. Means and standard deviations are presented in Table 7. Table

8

reflects ANOVA data relevant to this hypothesis. The relationships are depicted
graphically in Figures 5 and

6

.

Once again, the main effect for response mode was the only one to reach
significance. Judgment participants took significantly longer to make their decisions
than participants in a choice mode. Hypothesis 2, therefore, is not supported.
Exploratory Question 1. Information search patterns are presumed to reflect
decision-makers' thought patterns and strategies. The original intent was to examine
the differences between search patterns across experimental conditions. However,
further investigation of the data reveals that information search patterns were
remarkably invariant across experimental conditions. Participants overwhelmingly
preferred noncompensatory search patterns. Across all conditions, the greatest
proportion of compensatory search patterns was found in experimental trial

1

, in

which they were employed by 15% of participants. Given the lack of variability of
search patterns and that an exploration of alternative- vs. attribute-wise search
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Table 7
Trial Time as a Function of Response Mode and Affect
Affect Manipulation
Positive

Negative

Experimental Trial 1
Judgment Mode
M

471.24

500.84

SD

174.55

260.65

M

343.24

282.96

SD

230.82

110.77

Choice Mode

Experimental Trial 2
Judgment Mode
M

409.32

395.96

SD

150.80

213.81

M

282.44

270.76

SD

148.53

159.55

Choice Mode

Note. The values represent the amount of time spent, in seconds, per trial.
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Table 8
Analysis of Variance of Trial Time
F
Source

df

Experimental Trial 1

Experimental Trial 2

Response Mode (RM)

1

18.24***

13.64***

Affect (A)

1

.14

.13

RM x A

1

1.23

.00

Error

96

(40988.79)

Note. Mean square errors enclosed in parentheses.
* £ < . 0 5 . * * £ < .0 1 . * * * p < .001.

(28817.72)
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Figure 5. Mean trial time for experimental trial 1 as a function of response mode and
affect manipulations.
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Figure 6. Mean trial time for experimental trial 2 as a function of response mode and
affect manipulations.

600 n

Trial Time (s)

500 400 300 200

-

100

-

Judgment
Choice

Positive

Negative
Affective State

Response M ode and Affect

54
patterns is unlikely to be very educative, no further exploration of Exploratory
Question 1 is warranted.
Exploratory Question 2. It was felt initially that the amount of redundant
information searched might provide some alternate indication of the influence of
response mode and affective state on information evaluation models. Only the affect
manipulation appeared to have any influence here. Consultation of the cell means
(Table 9) and ANOVA results (Table 10) reveals a significant main effect for affect in
Experimental Trial 2. The homogeneity of variance test failed for Experimental Trial 2
(Cochran's C(2AA) — .56, £ < .001), reflecting a great disparity between the within-cell
variances. The analysis of variance, however, is relatively robust to violations of the
assumption of homogeneity of variance (Pagano, 1990). The result of the F test
should therefore be interpreted with caution, noting that the pattern of results is
similar to that of Experimental Trial 1.
The results are displayed graphically in Figures 7 and 8. W hile the main effect
was not significant in experimental trial 1, the means were in a similar direction. In
both trials, participants under negative affect examined fewer redundant items of
information than did participants under positive affect. Neither the response mode
main effect nor the interaction of response mode and affective state were significant.
Exploration of Low F Values
In calculating an analysis of variance with data that meet all the assumptions of
the statistic, one should calculate an F of 1 if there is, in fact, no effect. Review of the
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Table 9
Redundant Information as a Function of Response Mode and Affect
Affect Manipulation
Positive

Negative

Experimental Trial 1
Judgment Mode
M

47.52

48.68

SD

49.47

46.93

M

59.12

37.08

SD

59.77

33.19

Choice Mode

Experimental Trial 2
Judgment Mode
M

33.36

18.88

SD

30.58

16.26

M

38.00

22.96

SD

45.28

20.81

Choice Mode

Note. The values represent the number of unique items of information viewed more
than once.
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Table 10
Analysis of Variance of Redundant Information
F
Source

df

Experimental Trial 1

Experimental Trial 2

Response Mode (RM)

1

.00

Affect (A)

1

1.17

5.92*

RM x A

1

1.44

.00

96

(2331.04)

(920.62)

Error

Note. Mean square errors enclosed in parentheses.
* £ < . 0 5 . * * £ < .0 1 . * * * p < .0 0 1 .

.52
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Figure 7. Mean of redundant information for experimental trial 1 as a function of
response mode and affect manipulations.
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Figure 8. Mean of redundant information for experimental trial 2 as a function of
response mode and affect manipulations.
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statistics calculated above reveal a number of F values which seem to be rather less
than 1. Shine (1982) notes that these F ratios can be tested by taking their reciprocal
and testing the resulting value as an F with the degrees of freedom swapped. A
significant result in this latter test indicates an invalidity in the data or the model.
Since all ANOVA's calculated above have 1 and 96 degrees of freedom, testing the
left tail of the F distribution would result in a critical F96 of 253, the reciprocal of
which is 0.004. As a result, any F values in the present research which are less than
or equal to 0.004 are suspect. No such values were located.
Discussion
The present experiment attempted to demonstrate an interactive influence of
response modes and affective states on decision processes measured via process
tracing. Instead, response mode main effects dominated the analyses across
hypotheses. The judgment mode resulted in longer trial times, greater search depth,
and lower search variability across trials. Taken together, these findings suggest quite
clearly, and in line with previous research, that the judgment mode leads to more
effortful decision making than the choice mode.
Since the response mode manipulation was robust, the question then
becomes, what happened to the influence of affect? Since pretests showed that the
two films intended to influence affect had significantly different effects in the
appropriate directions, the lack of significant findings for affect can be interpreted
several different ways.
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Interpretation of Results
The engaging task hypothesis. In designing the experiment, it seemed natural
that making the task more interesting would encourage participants to pay more
attention to making their decisions. The "selecting a professor" task was chosen for
its relation to decisions commonly made by university students, thereby inferring
some intrinsic interest. According to comments offered by a number of participants
following the present experiment, the task was captivating indeed, and many wished
that such an information board (with real professors) was available prior to course
selection.
The selection of an engaging task followed from Billings and Scherer (1988),
who used a resident advisor-selection task with participants who lived in the
residence halls at the O hio State University. Participants in that experiment
uniformly rated the decision task as important, even when led to believe that their
responses would not be used outside of the experimental context.
In contrast, information board-based tasks in previous research appear to be
o f less interest to participants. For example, participants in the Isen and Means
(1983) study chose between fictitious cars, while those in the Lewinsohn and Mano
(1993, Study 1) experiment chose between brands of soft-sided luggage. Objectively,
these tasks are not particularly likely to captivate participants culled from a university
subject pool. As a result, factors external to the task, such as affective states, were
more likely to play a significant role in their behavior.
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By this logic, it is possible that the task in this experiment was too engaging.
The lack of variance across affect manipulations could then be attributable to the
exertion required for the task "drowning out" the influence of affect, to some degree.
In this scenario, participants became so focused on the task that their interest quickly
drowned out any effects from the affect manipulation.
Another unintended effect likely due to the large information load is a
reduced tendency for participants to engage in compensatory processing. Although a
compensatory decision process would be indicated by participants examining as few
as tw o attributes per alternative, it is rather unlikely that they would be so
economical. However, given the large number of alternatives and attributes, any
effort at a compensatory decision search would be very difficult beyond the first few
attributes examined. As a result, the minimal amount of compensatory processing
found in the present study appears attributable to the high information load placed
on participants.
The effortful task hypothesis. To avert the possibility of participants examining
every possible item of available information, this experiment employed a high
information load. Specifically, the information boards contained 8 alternatives, each
described by 16 attributes, for a total of 128 items of viewable information per board.
As Table 2 shows, the high information load was effective in preventing participants
from consistently examining the entire board. Across all experimental trials and

Response M ode and Affect

62
conditions, participants viewed a mean of 49.25% of all possible information, or
approximately 63 items of information.
However, making more information available in order to discourage viewing it
all may cause other, unintended effects. In particular, it does not appear unseemly to
hypothesize that making more information available to participants will encourage
them to be willing to consider more information in making their decisions. If one
must choose a car given only the attributes of price, color, and fuel economy, then
one can make such a decision in fairly good conscience. If, however, one is given a
greater number of attributes for use in making such comparisons, one will likely be
inclined to browse extensively. An increase in information considered naturally leads
to a concomitant increase in cognitive resources allocated to the task. The net result
is that participants concentrate on the task to such a degree that most if not all of
their cognitive resources are allocated to the task such that other influences on their
behavior are ignored.
The vanishing affect hypothesis. A third possibility in line with the first two is
that the influence of the affective manipulation was not strong enough to remain
robust through the experimental trials. Affect manipulations seem to be fairly short
lived in their effects. For example, Frost and Green (1982) found that participants'
moods had significantly improved only 10 minutes after a manipulation inducing
depression. W ithin the same tim e frame, the influences of a positive affect
manipulation had vanished completely. Interestingly, participants spent the 10-
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minute interval sitting quietly. If affect manipulations decay so quickly in the absence
of a task, it is very likely that the presence of a task requiring a maximum of cognitive
resources will hasten the process further. If this is so, there should be no differences
in affect across cells by the end of the experiment, for participants w ill have been
reduced to a neutral affective state by the combination of affect manipulation decay
and task demands.
All three of the above hypotheses are viable and may operate in tandem.
Data culled from the present experiment allow for some testing of them. It is quite
clear that manipulated affect had no discernable influence on decision processes.
However, this is not to say that affective state was not influential. It is quite possible
that, independent of the affect manipulation, participants' affect influenced their
decision processes. If the engaging task or effortful task hypotheses were to be
supported, then there would be no relationship between the affect subscales and
measures of the decision processes. However, if affect did indeed influence decision
processes in a systematic way, there would be significant correlations between scores
on the affect subscales and key measures of the decision process, such as search
depth, search variability, trial time, and redundant information viewed. In fact, no
consistent correlations were found across trials between scores on the affect subscales
and the key process-tracing measures, lending support to the engaging and effortful
task hypotheses. Since these two hypotheses have similar effects, it is not possible to
distinguish further between them.
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The vanishing affect hypothesis proposed that the manipulated affective state
would quickly decay and be replaced by a neutral affective state. Analyses
conducted on the affect scales completed following participation revealed significant
differences in post-trial affect across cells. As a result, it appears that the vanishing
affect hypothesis is unsupportable, for participants were not experiencing similar
affect at the end of the experiment.
To conclude, it appears that the task invited too much concentration to permit
the subtle influence of affect, at least as manipulated through movie viewing, to
enter. W hile this finding is to be taken into account in future research using
information boards, it is certainly educational regarding the strength of affective
influences in decision making. As noted above, most experiments examining
affective influences on decision making employ tasks that are not particularly
challenging or engaging. In these contexts, it is appropriate to suggest that affect will
influence decision making, but with the caveat that the decision must not be one
requiring a great deal of cognitive resources. Certainly, most decisions are of this
nature. It's easy to see that one's affective state will influence decision processes in a
choice of laundry detergents. However, decisions requiring more cognitive
resources, such as a choice of plastic surgeons, appear from this study to be less
susceptible to the whim of affect.
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Limitations
In general, this study attempted to verify that affect influences decision making
in the context of a task permitting variations in effort and decision strategy.
However, where the task demands a thoughtful, thorough approach to decision
making, affective influences were hypothesized to be weakened or neutralized
altogether. The present study used an information board as the basic task paradigm
because it permits quantification of key aspects of information evaluation.
Additionally, an engaging task, selecting professors, was chosen to keep participants
interested. The affect manipulation, Hollywood film clips, was chosen for its success
in previous research. Though the above aspects of the experimental design were
chosen for their appropriateness to the research question, each carries with it certain
limitations to the type and breadth of conclusions that can be drawn from the results.
The following discussion expands further upon these limitations.
Information boards. As noted above, the information available to the
participants was structured into information boards to better track the patterns by
which they examine it. This technique was made popular by Payne (1976) and is
widely employed in a manner similar to that described here (e.g., "Mouselab",
Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993). However, the technique also presumes that
information boards integrate into a natural decision process. This assumption is
questionable.
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W hile information boards function well as an aid in multiattribute utility
calculations, their use presumes such a structured approach to the task. Indeed, by
using such a technique to examine the processes by which participants make
decisions, the experiment forces participants to adopt such processes themselves.
Post-experiment comments by the participants indicated some unfamiliarity with
such a structured approach to the task. Generally, those participants expressing
opinions about the information boards noted that it seemed like a good way to make
decisions and felt they had learned something in that regard.
The information board is therefore not a "transparent" way to track decision
processes. W hile information boards enable researchers to systematically evaluate
how people make decisions regarding multiple alternatives, they also force
participants, to some degree, to make their decisions in a manner compatible with
the information board. Conclusions about decision processes based solely on such
studies are therefore unwarranted due to the confusion of task and process measure.
Engaging Task. The task employed in the present study, selecting a professor,
was based on the author's experience at another educational institution. At the
beginning of each semester, the student council published a list of the professors,
their overall teaching ratings, and the distribution of grades in their classes. Most
students paid attention to the information presented in these publications, and
undoubtedly this led to some hasty course and section changes each year. The
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general idea of selecting a professor based on various criteria was then adapted and
expanded to include a wide range of information to assist in the evaluation process.
W hile students at the present institution are not privy to the types of
information described above, it seemed logical that they might still engage in some
sort of informal polling of their fellow students as they selected their courses. Hence,
it was believed that the participants in this experiment would find it a familiar,
somewhat interesting task. Instead, the task appeared to engender rather more
interest than it really warranted, as noted above. The concern here is that the
interest generated by the task likely led participants to "explore" the available
information instead of simply searching for the information necessary to make the
decision. Presumably, a less-interesting task, such as a choice between brands of
soft-sided luggage (e.g., Lewinsohn & Mano, 1993, Study 1), would lead to more
systematic decision behavior.
Affect manipulation. The intent of the present study was to assess decision
processes under common "day-to-day" positive and negative affective states. The
manipulation of affect involved viewing evocative film clips from Hollywood
movies— certainly nothing to pose an extraordinary emotional burden on the
participant. As it turned out, the affect manipulation was overwhelmed by the
difficulty or engaging aspect of the task, leading to the unfortunate conclusion that
this experiment permits few inferences to be drawn about the role of affect in
decision processes.
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The affect manipulation used here strikes a difficult middle ground between
more forceful or personal manipulations and no manipulations at all. In the former
case, previous research has used more evocative films, such as depictions of Nazi
concentration camps (e.g., Isen & Daubman, 1984), or more subjectively relevant
manipulations, such as falsified task performance feedback (e.g., Forgas, 1989, 1991).
Although professional issues prevented the use of such manipulations, their
forcefulness may have been beneficial in the present experiment as a counterbalance
to the strong task effect.
Alternately, a better test of the influence of "day-to-day" affect on decision
processes would be simply to have no affect manipulation at all. In this scenario,
participants would be divided into positive and negative affect groups based on their
responses to the affect questionnaire. However, concerns about obtaining an
adequate distribution of affect prevented such a quasi-manipulation. Also, given the
demanding nature of the task, this latter strategy is unlikely to have worked, anyway,
although it would have circumvented concerns that the manipulation was
insufficiently powerful or enduring.
Lack of affect manipulation check. In designing the Primary Study, it was felt
that including a manipulation check following the affect manipulation would sensitize
the participants to the intent of the study. Given that the participant pool remained
the same across the two experiments, the effects of the affect manipulation as
measured in Pilot Study 1 were assumed to hold true for the Primary Study as well.
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However, since the results of the affect endurance check only partially matched those
of the affect manipulation check from Pilot Study 1, there is reason to regret the lack
of a manipulation check in the Primary Study.
Additional helpful measures. As noted above, there are no data available to
distinguish between the engaging and effortful task hypotheses. In hindsight, scales
to measure these constructs would have been very helpful. The present author will
make sure to include such measures inn future research employing the paradigm
described above.
Suggestions for Future Research
Information load. The lack of influence for the affect manipulation in the
present experiment was partially attributed to the high information load placed upon
participants. Although the loss of the affect manipulation prevented a true test of the
hypotheses presented above, the discovery that a suitably high information load can
help obliterate the influence of affect is intriguing in and of itself. This suggests a
complex interplay between the task and other factors, such as contextual effects and
characteristics of the decision maker.
Several possible follow-up studies spring to mind. The most obvious is a study
identical to the present one, but employing a reduced information load. Should
significant interactions be found in the hypothesized directions, the information load
hypothesis for the lack of such effects in the present study would be supported.
Further, such a finding would lay the groundwork for further exploration of possible
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interactions between task factors (such as information load) and factors outside of the
task, including affect.
Another follow-up study could address the information-board issue discussed
in the limitations section above. One likely reason that participants were able to
integrate so much information into their decisions was that the information was
organized in an optimal manner for multiattribute decision making. Rarely in civilian
life is information ever organized so conveniently. If participants were given a
disorganized jumble of information (on a set of shuffled cue cards, for example) that
was identical in content to the present study, they would probably have a more
difficult time making their decisions. Indeed, they would likely look at less
information, take less time, and display more non-compensatory processing, simply
because there is a higher cost in effort to get that information. Similarly, their
affective state would have more opportunity to play a role in their decision making
because the task is not conducive to intense concentration. This study, too, would
illustrate the interplay of task and extra-task factors.
Task changes. As discussed above, the "selecting a professor" task used in the
present study is problematic. It was chosen in an attempt to strike a balance between
internal and external validity— to study a decision typically made by the participants
in a manner permitting observation and recording of many aspects of the decision
process. However, since students at the present institution appear not to make such
informed choices in the manner portrayed here, the link to external validity seems
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weak. As well, since participants expressed such interest in the content of the task
and likely spent some time exploring the information available, the internal validity of
the experiment appears threatened as well. These problems could be easily
overcome by changing to a less-engaging, but still somewhat personally relevant task,
such as a choice of vacation destinations, and re-running the experiment.
Improved research methods. Since the present study was begun, further
research into information boards has resulted in improvements to the paradigm. For
example, Bockenholt and Hynan (1994) report that the Payne index (Payne, 1976) as
employed in the present study misrepresents random information selection strategies
as systematic, especially where the number of alternatives and attributes are not
identical. They present an alternative methodology based on the chi-square statistic,
and show how it improves on the Payne index. Use of such improved
methodologies in future research can only enhance our ability to track and
understand participants' decision behavior.
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Appendix: Attributes and Attribute Levels in the "Selecting a Professor" Task

Number of top ratings
10 students in last class gave professor highest overall rating
15 students in last class gave professor highest overall rating
20 students in last class gave professor highest overall rating
25 students in last class gave professor highest overall rating

Pages of reading per class
400 last semester
550 last semester
700 last semeser
850 last semester

Number of courses taught

8

Years of experience
1

2
3
4
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Average pages of notes
3.0 per class hour for a typical student
5.0 per class hour for a typical student
7.0 per class hour for a typical student
9.0 per class hour for a typical student

Average exam mark
90.0%
80.0%
70.0%
60.0%

Average reading per week
1.0 chapters
2.0 chapters
3.0 chapters
4.0 chapters

Average exams per course
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
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Penalties for late essays
None
M inor
Moderate
M ajor

Grading style
Very easy
Easy
Moderate
Difficult

Distributes lecture notes
Never
Rarely
Sometimes
Regularly

Course pace
Very slow
Moderately slow
Moderately fast
Very fast
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Types of visual aids used
Chalkboard with colored chalk
Overhead projector
Photocopied handouts
Computerized presentation

Class participation
Generally not encouraged
Mainly before exams
Only to ask or answer questions
Detailed discussion and debate

Typical student comment
Dull lectures and dull textbook
Good lectures but the textbook was tough to read
Learned almost everything from the textbook
Good lectures and good text

Attitude toward job
Can't w ait for retirement to stop teaching
Doesn't mind teaching but prefers outside interests
Finds teaching somewhat enjoyable
Takes great pleasure in teaching

